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Abstract
Several scientific fields including psychology are undergoing a replication crisis.
There are many reasons for this problem, one of which is a misuse of p-values. There
are several alternatives to p-values, and in this paper we describe a complement that
is geared towards replication. In particular, we focus on confidence intervals for the
probability that a parameter estimate will exceed a specified value in an exact repli-
cation study. These intervals convey uncertainty in a way that p-values and standard
confidence intervals do not, and can help researchers to draw sounder scientific con-
clusions. After briefly reviewing background on p-values and a few alternatives, we
describe our approach and provide examples with simulated and real data. For linear
models, we also describe how confidence intervals for the exceedance probability are
related to p-values and confidence intervals for parameters.
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1 Introduction
Several scientific fields including psychology are undergoing a replication crisis (Ioannidis,
2005; Prinz et al., 2011; Begley and Ellis, 2012; Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012), which has
led to increased attempts to understand the replicability and reliability of scientific studies
(Open Science Collaboration, 2015; Johnson et al., 2017). There are many reasons for
this problem, including publication bias, p-hacking, failing to correct for multiple testing,
and underpowered studies, though p-values and null hypothesis testing have come under
particular scrutiny. This prompted the ASA to release a statement providing guidance
on the proper interpretation and use of p-values (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016), as well
as a follow-up in which several authors provided additional perspectives and proposal for
“moving to a world beyond ‘p < 0.05’ ” (Wasserstein et al., 2019).
In this article, we discuss a complement to p-values that is similar to the reproducibil-
ity probability sometimes used in clinical trials (Goodman, 1992; Shao and Chow, 2002;
De Martini, 2008, 2012, 2013; Boos and Stefanski, 2011), as well as to metrics used in
quality control to assess the probability of meeting specifications (Meeker et al., 2017). In
particular, we focus on confidence intervals for the probability that in an exact replication
study, a parameter estimate will exceed a specified value based on sampling variability
alone. We refer to these intervals as confidence intervals for the exceedance probability.
Confidence intervals for the exceedance probability convey uncertainty in point esti-
mates in a way that p-values and confidence intervals for parameter estimates (standard
confidence intervals) do not. In particular, the exceedance probability can be interpreted
similarly to statistical power, and confidence intervals for the exceedance probability con-
vey the stability of a result. Even if an exact replication study is not feasible, we think that
characterizing uncertainty in these terms can help researchers to contextualize uncertainty
and draw sounder scientific conclusions, particularly with small to medium sample sizes.
Like the p-values and standard confidence intervals they complement, confidence intervals
for the exceedance probability provide information about the strength of evidence, but do
not provide conclusive evidence for whether a result will replicate and are not a substitute
for conducting replication studies.
Problems with replication have been prevalent in psychology, among other fields. In
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psychology there have been efforts to clarify the generalizability of studies (Brandt et al.,
2014), as well as the criteria for conducting replications (Simons et al., 2017) and declaring
success (Rosenthal, 1997). However, exact replications are not usually feasible (Stroebe and
Strack, 2014; Fabrigar and Wegener, 2016), which leads to between-study heterogeneity
(McShane and Bo¨ckenholt, 2014; Van Erp et al., 2017; Stanley et al., 2018; McShane et al.,
2019b). Consequently, confidence intervals for the exceendance probability, which account
for sampling variability but not between-study heterogeneity, represent a lower bound on
uncertainty. However, as we show through simulations and an analysis of data collected
as part of the Open Science Collaboration (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), even this
lower bound can help to put p-values into perspective.
Confidence intervals for the exceedance probability have been used in practice in fields
other than psychology. In particular, Meeker et al. (2017, Chapters 2.2.3 and 4.5) gives
examples of how confidence intervals for the exceedance probability can be used for quality
control to assess the probability of meeting specifications, and Shao and Chow (2002)
and De Martini (2012, 2013) demonstrate how confidence intervals for the reproducibility
probability (i.e. the power of an exact replication study) can be used to make decisions in
clinical trials regarding sample size and the strength of evidence for single study approvals.
We extend previous work to general linear models and the context of psychological
research, and study the relationship with p-values and standard confidence intervals. For
linear combinations of normal random variables, there is a clear connection between confi-
dence intervals for the exceedance probability, standard confidence intervals, and p-values,
which complements the findings of De Martini (2008). In addition to providing context for
interpreting confidence intervals for the exceedance probability, these relationships provide
perspective on p-values and standard confidence intervals.
The work of Gelman and Carlin (2014) is also related, though whereas Gelman and
Carlin (2014) calculate the probability of sign and magnitude errors for fixed effect size
and variance, we focus on confidence intervals that treat the estimated effect size and vari-
ance as random. In a similar vein, Cumming and Maillardet (2006) study the probability
that a confidence interval from an initial study will contain the point estimate from a repli-
cation study. However, whereas Cumming and Maillardet (2006) studied these properties
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in aggregate and used their findings to address common misconceptions of confidence in-
tervals and replicability, we focus on confidence intervals that can be used in individual
data analyses.
In Section 2, we give an overview of common shortcomings of p-values and statistical
significance thresholds, and note two prominent suggestions for addressing those issues
within a hypothesis testing framework. In Section 3, we give motivating use cases in
which the exceedance probability is relevant to the scientific question, and introduce our
framework for computing exceedance probabilities and associated confidence intervals. In
Section 4, we focus on the exceedance probability for linear combinations of normal random
variables and show how confidence intervals for the exceedance probability are related to
standard confidence intervals and p-values in this setting. In Section 5, we give examples
with both simulated and real data of how confidence intervals for the exceedance probability
can be used in practice, and how they compare to p-values, standard confidence intervals,
and Bayes factors. In Section 6, we conclude and suggest areas for future work.
2 Background
2.1 Limitations of p-values and statistical significance thresholds
Let y ∈ Rn be an observation of the random vector Y that follows a distribution with
parameter θ ∈ R. Also let T (Y ) ∈ R be a test statistic for which larger values are more
extreme, and let H0 : θ ∈ Θ0 and H1 : θ 6∈ Θ0 be the null and alternative hypotheses. The p-
value is given by p(y) = supθ∈Θ0 Pr(T (Y ) ≥ T (y)). For example, suppose Yi
i.i.d.∼ N(θ, σ2),
i = 1, . . . , n, with known variance σ2. Then under the null H0 : θ = θ0 and alternative
H1 : θ 6= θ0, we can use the statistic T (y) =
√
n|y¯ − θ0|/σ to obtain the two-sided p-value
p(y) = 2[1−Φ(T (y))] where y¯ is the sample mean and Φ is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function (CDF).
P-values are simple, scalable summaries of data that can be useful in scientific research
if used appropriately. However, p-values are frequently misinterpreted. For example, p-
values are commonly interpreted as one minus the probability of replication, or as the
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posterior probability of the null hypothesis Pr(H0|y) (Oakes, 1986; Cohen, 1994; Haller
and Krauss, 2002; Gigerenzer, 2018). As noted by several authors, sometimes the p-value
is similar to the posterior probability, but in many cases it is not (Lindley, 1957; Pratt,
1965; Berger and Sellke, 1987; Cassella and Berger, 1987; Nuzzo, 2014). Furthermore, even
if interpreted correctly, p-values are random variables that can exhibit large amounts of
variability (Boos and Stefanski, 2011), which can affect the probability of replicating a
small p-value in future studies.
The problems with p-values are compounded when they are used in conjunction with
dichotomizing statistical significance thresholds (Cohen, 1994; Gigerenzer, 2004; Amrhein
et al., 2017; Gigerenzer, 2018). The dichotomization of p-values based on whether they
are above or below a threshold frequently causes researchers to misinterpret the evidence
itself as dichotomous (McShane and Gal, 2016, 2017), because statistical significance is
commonly confused with scientific significance (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996; McShane and
Gal, 2017). Furthermore, the conventional cutoff of 0.05 is based on historical convenience
(being the p-value corresponding to about two standard normal deviations) as opposed to
a scientific rationale (Kennedy-Shaffer, 2019; Ruberg et al., 2019).
Due to these concerns, many researchers have advocated for reforms, such as shifting
emphasis away from p-values and towards other aspects of a study, including how the study
was conducted, any problems that arose, and what analytic methods were used, as well
as avoiding overconfidence in statistical inference (McShane et al., 2019a; Amrhein et al.,
2019b). Others have noted the importance of understanding common cognitive biases,
prespecifying analyses, changing institutional norms, focusing on false positive rates, and
the use of Bayesian modeling of interactions (Gelman, 2015; Leek et al., 2017; Greenland,
2017). There have also been efforts to ban p-values, but these initiatives may have harmed
rather than improved the quality of scientific research (Fricker Jr et al., 2019).
2.2 Hypothesis testing alternatives
Several suggestions have been made to alleviate the problems of the p < 0.05 cutoff within
the setting of hypothesis tests. Notably, Benjamin et al. (2017) proposed to change the
cutoff to p < 0.005 in fields that have not already adopted a more stringent cutoff. However,
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several researchers have expressed concern that lowering the threshold would not fix the
problems and may actually exacerbate them (Trafimow et al., 2018; Lakens et al., 2018;
Amrhein and Greenland, 2018). Furthermore, while Benjamin et al. (2017) describe the
benefits of lowering the threshold, they also note that there may be other alternatives that
do not involve hypothesis testing.
Another long-standing alternative is the Bayes factors (Jeffreys, 1935, 1961) (see Kass
and Raftery (1995) for an overview). The Bayes factor in favor of H0 and against H1 is
B01(t) = Pr(t|H0)/Pr(t|H1), which can also be written as the ratio of the posterior odds in
favor ofH0 to the prior odds in favor ofH0, i.e. B01(t) = [Pr(H0|t)/Pr(H1|t)]/[Pr(H0)/Pr(H1)].
Conclusions based on the p-value do not always agree with conclusions based on the Bayes
factor (Edwards et al., 1963; DeGroot, 1973; Dickey, 1977; Shafer, 1982). For point null
hypotheses, Bayes factors tend to be more conservative, i.e. Bayes factors provide less
evidence against the null hypothesis than p-values (Berger and Mortera, 1991).
To conduct hypothesis tests with Bayes factors, one must use cutoff values to determine
whether the observed data provides sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis. Jeffreys
(1961, Appendix B) recommends cutoffs on the logarithmic scale for this purpose, and Kass
and Raftery (1995) note that the cutoffs proposed by Jeffreys (1961) are sensible in practice.
Nonetheless, Bayes factors do require a cutoff threshold just as with p-values, which make
Bayes factors prone to similar misuses.
3 Exceedance probability for parameter estimates
3.1 Motivating use cases
Suppose we are interested in estimating parameter θ = (θ1, . . . , θd)
T, particularly the jth
element θj, 1 ≤ j ≤ d. Furthermore, suppose we are only interested in whether θj > c
for some substantively meaningful cutoff c. Many scientific questions in psychology and
other fields can be framed in this way. For example, θj might be the difference in response
times of subjects to different stimuli, the difference in standardized test scores for students
who undergo different curriculum, the increase in asthma rates per increase in ambient
particulate matter, or the difference in tumor response rates between cancer patients who
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receive different treatments.
In all of the use cases above, if the effect size θj is greater than some substantively
meaningful cutoff c, the result might warrant further study or action. Staying within a
hypothesis testing framework, we could test the one-sided hypothesis H0 : θj ≤ c versus
the alternative H1 : θj > c. However, in many cases it is more informative to focus on
estimation, particularly when θj is an interpretable quantity, because we believe this way
of thinking tends to align with the mindset of many scientists.
Let θˆj be an estimate of θj in an initial experiment or study. As a complement to
hypothesis testing that focuses on estimation we could ask, “given the results of the initial
study, what is the probability of obtaining a θˆj > c result in a replication study?” In a
Bayesian framework, we could answer this question with the posterior predictive distribu-
tion (Gelman et al., 2014; Billheimer, 2019).
In many cases a Bayesian approach may be useful for understanding uncertainty in
future estimates, particularly to account for between-study heterogeneity. However, as
described below, frequentist confidence intervals for the exceedance probability can also be
informative, in that they describe the uncertainty in an estimate due to sampling variability
alone.
3.2 Framework
LetD be a matrix of observed data from the initial study consisting of n observations/rows.
For example, in a regression problem we might have D = [y,x1, . . . ,xd] where y,xj ∈ Rn
are the outcome and jth covariate, respectively. Let Drep be a matrix of data from a
replication study with m observations, i.e. a separate, independent dataset sampled from
the same population asD. For example, Drep = [yrep,xrep1 , . . . ,x
rep
d ] where y
rep,xrepj ∈ Rm.
Also, let θˆ = θˆ(D) and θˆrep = θˆ(Drep) be estimators of a parameter θ = (θ1, . . . , θd)
T using
datasets D and Drep, respectively. We assume θˆ and θˆrep are estimated with the same
procedure but different data.
We focus on normally distributed estimators with shared population parameters. Specif-
ically, we assume that θˆj ∼ N(θj, σ2j/n) and θˆrepj ∼ N(θj, σ2j/m), where both estimators
have the same population parameters θj and σ
2
j , 1 ≤ j ≤ d. The true exceedance proba-
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bility that θˆrepj > c is
Pr
θj ,σj
(θˆrepj > c) = Pr
(√
m(θˆrepj − θj)/σj >
√
m(c− θj)/σj
)
= 1− Φ (√m(c− θj)/σj) . (1)
We aim to estimate (1) after collecting D but prior to collecting Drep. Because we
assume that θˆj and θˆ
rep
j share the same population parameters, we plug in θˆj and σˆj to (1)
to obtain the point estimate
Pr
θˆj ,σˆj
(θˆrepj > c) = 1− Φ
(√
m(c− θˆj)/σˆj
)
. (2)
The point estimate (2) may not be reliable, particularly for small sample sizes or highly
variable data, so it is crucial to consider confidence intervals that account for uncertainty
both in θˆj and σˆj. For θˆ and θˆ
rep that are linear combinations of normal random variables,
pointwise confidence intervals can be formed based on a t-distribution pivotal quantity as
described in Section 4.2. In other cases, such as maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs), it
may be possible to construct confidence intervals with normal approximations or bootstrap
methods (De Martini, 2013). The confidence intervals can be reported for either a single
scientifically meaningful cutoff c or a series of c.
We allow for m 6= n, because even if the replication study aims to collect the same
number of observations as the initial study, there might be some discrepancy due to a
variety of data collection challenges or study design decisions. Consequently, it may be
helpful to consider a few replication sample sizes m near the initial study size n to assess
the sensitivity of results.
We emphasize that c is intended to represent a substantively meaningful value. While
it may be challenging to select c in many applied settings, doing so can better tie the
statistical analysis to the scientific research question.
We also note that for a certain choice of hypothesis test and cutoff c, the exceedance
probability (1) is equivalent to power. In particular, for the null H0 : θj ≤ θj0 and alter-
native H1 : θj > θj0, and setting m = n and c = θj0 + z1−ασj/
√
n where z1−α = Φ(1− α),
the exceedance probability (1) becomes 1− Φ(z1−α −
√
n(θj − θj0)/σj). This is the power
of the test when σj is known, also referred to as the population reproducibility probability
(Boos and Stefanski, 2011).
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While this framework is motivated in terms of a replication study, the exceedance
probability given by (2) is purely a function of data collected in the initial study. Therefore,
by setting m = n, confidence intervals for the exceedance probability can also be seen as
expressing the uncertainty about θj on the probability scale with respect to a cutoff c,
regardless of whether a replication study is feasible or planned.
4 Linear combinations of normal random variables
4.1 Exceedance probability
Suppose that θˆ = Ay for fixed A ∈ Rd×n and y ∼ N(µ, ν2V ) where V is a known
nonsingular and positive definite n × n matrix and E[θˆ] = θ, with an equivalent form
for θˆrep. Then
√
n(θˆ − θ) ∼ N(0,Σ) where Σ = nν2AV AT is the variance, with an
analogous result for θˆrep. For example, for the sample mean of n independent observations,
we have yi ∼ N(µ, ν2), i = 1, . . . , n, A = (1/n, . . . , 1/n), and Σ = nν2AAT = ν2.
For linear regression with design matrix X ∈ Rn×d and outcome y ∼ N(Xθ, ν2V ), the
general least squares estimate gives A = (XTV −1X)−1XTV −1 and Σ = nν2AV AT =
nν2(XTV −1X)−1.
We estimate the marginal variance as σˆ2j = Σˆjj where Σˆ = nνˆ
2AV AT for νˆ2 =
(n− d)−1‖yˆ − y‖22 and fitted values yˆ. Then as noted in Section 3.2, we plug in θˆj and σˆ2j
to (2) to obtain a point estimate for the marginal exceedance probability that θˆrepj > c.
4.2 Confidence intervals
Let Fn−d,δ be the t-distribution with n− d degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
δ. As shown in Appendix A, which builds on Meeker et al. (2017, Appendix E.3.4), a
two-sided 1− α confidence interval for Prθj ,σj(θˆrepj > c) is given by[
1− Φ
(√
m
n
δU(c)
)
, 1− Φ
(√
m
n
δL(c)
)]
, (3)
where δL(c) and δU(c) are solutions to Fn−d,δL(c)(q) = 1− α/2 and Fn−d,δU (c)(q) = α/2 for
q =
√
n(c− θˆj)/σˆj. (4)
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Similarly, one-sided 1−α confidence intervals can be obtained by solving Fn−d,δL(c)(q) = 1−
α and Fn−d,δU (c)(q) = α to get bounds for upper and lower confidence intervals, respectively.
As described in Appendix A, these confidence intervals are formed from a t-distribution
pivotal quantity and account for uncertainty in both θˆj and σˆj. Consequently, they are
able to maintain their nominal coverage probability even in small samples when the model
is correctly specified, as demonstrated in Appendix B.
Meeker et al. (2017) focus on confidence intervals for the sample mean and m = n.
However, as we show in Appendix A, it is straightforward to extend the approach of Meeker
et al. (2017) to arbitrary linear combinations of normal random variables, d > 1 mean
parameters, and m 6= n.
We note that Shao and Chow (2002) and De Martini (2008) provide confidence interval
procedures for the reproducibility probability with a focus on test statistics, such as stu-
dentized means. Shao and Chow (2002) and De Martini (2008) use essentially the same
pivotal quantity as Meeker et al. (2017) to obtain confidence intervals for the noncentrality
parameter, but plug the lower bound for the noncentrality parameter into a t-distribution
instead of a normal distribution to obtain a lower bound on power.
4.3 Relationship to confidence intervals for θ
In this section, we analyze the relationship between confidence intervals for Prθj ,σj(θˆ
rep
j > c)
and confidence intervals for θj. To simplify notation, throughout this section we drop the
subscript j, though we assume that θ = θj where θ = (θ1, . . . , θd)
T, 1 ≤ j ≤ d. We also
make the sample size in the replication study explicit in the notation as θˆrep,m. We use
tn−d,1−α/2 = F−1n−d,0(1 − α/2) to denote the 1 − α/2 quantile of the central t-distribution
with n− d degrees of freedom.
The results in this section given by Corollaries 1 and 2 are demonstrated in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the x-axis shows the cutoff c, the y-axis shows the exceedance probability, the
solid black S-shaped curve shows the point estimate for the exceedance probability, and
the gray area shows the point-wise confidence intervals for the exceedance probability. The
pointwise confidence interval for a cutoff c is given by the vertical slice through the plot
that intersects the x-axis at c. For example, for m = 100 and c = θˆL, the point estimate
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is Prθˆj ,σˆj(θˆ
rep
j > θˆL) ≈ 1.0 and the 95% confidence interval for the exceedance probability
is [0.5, 1]. The point estimate and 95% confidence interval for θˆ are also shown as a point
and horizontal error bar, respectively.
We begin by stating Lemma 1, which is the basis for the subsequent results in this
section. Throughout, we assume the data D, sample size n ∈ N and estimates θˆ ∈ R and
σˆ ∈ (0,∞) are fixed.
Lemma 1. Let θˆL = θˆ − tn−d,1−α/2σˆ/
√
n and θˆU = θˆ + tn−d,1−α/2σˆ/
√
n. Then δU(θˆL) = 0,
and δL(θˆU) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let c = θˆL. Then the argument q to the non-central t-distribution
given by (4) is
q =
√
n(c− θˆ)
σˆ
=
√
n
(
θˆ − tn−d,1−α/2σˆ/
√
n− θˆ
)
σˆ
= −tn−d,1−α/2.
Therefore, δU(θˆL) is the solution to Fn−d,δU (θˆL)(−tn−d,1−α/2) = α/2. By the symmetry
of the central t-distribution about zero, we have −tn−d,1−α/2 = tn−d,α/2. Consequently,
Fn−d,δU (θˆL)(−tn−d,1−α/2) = Fn−d,δU (θˆL)(tn−d,α/2), and by definition Fn−d,δU (θˆL)(tn−d,α/2) = α/2
if and only if δU(θˆL) = 0. This shows that δU(θˆL) = 0. An analogous argument shows that
δL(θˆU) = 0, which proves the lemma.
We now describe how confidence intervals for θ can be read from the plot of Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m >
c) presented in Figure 1. From (2), we have Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > θˆ) = 0.5 for all m. Corol-
lary 1 gives a similar result for the confidence intervals around Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > θˆL) and
Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > θˆU). We note that Corollary 1 in this paper is complementary to Corollaries
1 and 2 in De Martini (2008), though De Martini (2008) focuses on hypothesis testing.
Corollary 1. Let θˆL and θˆU be as defined in Lemma 1. Then the lower bound of the
two-sided 1−α confidence interval around Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep,m > θˆL) is equal to 0.5, and the upper
bound of the two-sided 1− α confidence interval around Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep,m > θˆU) is equal to 0.5.
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Proof of Corollary 1. The two-sided 1 − α confidence interval about Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep,m > c) is
given by [1 − Φ(√m/nδU(c)), 1 − Φ(√m/nδL(c))] for δU and δL described in Section 4.1.
By Lemma 1, δU(θˆL) = 0 for all m. Therefore, for all m, the lower bound of the two-sided
1−α confidence interval about Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep,m > θˆL) is 1−Φ(
√
m/nδU(θˆL)) = 1−Φ(0) = 0.5.
An analogous argument shows that for all m, the upper bound of the two-sided 1 − α
confidence interval about Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > θˆU) is equal to 0.5. This proves the corollary.
As a consequence of Corollary 1, and noting that [θˆL, θˆU ] as given in Lemma 1 is a
two-sided 1 − α confidence interval for θ, it follows that the two-sided 1 − α confidence
interval for θ can be read directly from the plot of Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep > c) shown in Figure 1. This
is done by drawing a horizontal line across the plot at Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep > c) = 0.5 on the y-axis
and finding the leftmost and rightmost points c at which the horizontal line intersects the
confidence bands.
We now describe the asymptotic behavior of the confidence intervals for Prθ,σ(θˆ
rep,m > c)
as m goes to infinity. First, we note that as m → ∞, Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep,m > c) → 1 for c < θˆ
and Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > c) → 0 for c > θˆ. By Corollary 2, the confidence interval around
Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > c) converges in a similar manner, which is demonstrated in Figure 1.
Corollary 2. Let θˆL and θˆU be as defined in Lemma 1. Then
1− Φ
(√
m/nδU(c)
)
→

1 c < θˆL
0.5 c = θˆL
0 c > θˆL
as m→∞ (5)
and
1− Φ
(√
m/nδL(c)
)
→

1 c < θˆU
0.5 c = θˆU
0 c > θˆU
as m→∞. (6)
Proof of Corollary 2. By Lemma 1, δU(θˆL) = 0. Furthermore δU(c) is a strictly monotone
increasing function of c. Consequently, δU(c) < 0 for c < θˆL, and δU(c) > 0 for c > θˆL. It
follows that as m→∞, √m/nδU(c)→ −∞ for c < θˆL and √m/nδU(c)→∞ for c > θˆL.
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Therefore, as m → ∞, 1 − Φ(√m/nδU(c)) → 1 for c < θˆL and 1 − Φ(√m/nδU(c)) → 0
for c > θˆL. Furthermore, because δU(θˆL) = 0, we have 1 − Φ(
√
m/nδU(θˆL)) = 0.5 for all
m. This shows that the conditions in (5) hold. An analogous argument shows that the
conditions in (6) hold, which proves the corollary.
Figure 1: Exceedance probability for the sample mean (data simulated as described in
Section 5) with n = 100. The solid black line shows Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > c) and the gray area
shows the 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The pointwise confidence interval for a cutoff
c is given by the vertical slice through the plot that intersects the x-axis at c. The point
estimate θˆ and confidence interval [θˆL, θˆU ] = [θˆ ± tn−1,1−α/2σˆn/
√
n] for α = 0.05 are shown
by the single point and horizontal error bars at Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep,m > c) = 0.5. Large m shown to
demonstrate Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 provides a way to interpret the 1−α confidence interval [θˆL, θˆU ] in terms of
the estimation uncertainty in a replication study as the sample size of the replication study
becomes large. In particular, as the sample size m of the replication study goes to infinity,
the probability of obtaining an estimate θˆrep,m ∈ [θˆL, θˆU ] goes to 1−α. Conceptually, there
is no sampling variability in the replication study in the limit as m → ∞, so all sampling
variability is from the initial study of size n. Because [θˆL, θˆU ] covers the true parameter θ
with probability 1− α, it is not surprising that in the limit as m→∞, [θˆL, θˆU ] also covers
θˆrep,m with probability 1− α.
This slightly different emphasis might be useful for teaching purposes to help reinforce
the definition of confidence intervals. In particular, by emphasizing the uncertainty in a
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random but observable parameter estimate, as opposed to the uncertainty about a fixed but
unobservable parameter value, this interpretation might be more accessible in application-
oriented introductory settings. This interpretation requires that the replication study be
identical to the initial study in all respects except for sample size.
While Corollary 2 demonstrates a connection between confidence intervals for the ex-
ceedance probability and confidence intervals for θ as m → ∞, we emphasize that in
practice we recommend choosing m similar to n to avoid misrepresenting the amount of
certainty in the replication.
We also note that all of the above results can be adapted to one-sided confidence
intervals. For example, lower confidence intervals for θ have the form [θˆL,∞) where θˆL =
θˆ− tn−d,1−ασˆ/
√
n. Therefore, by replacing tn−d,1−α/2 with tn−d,1−α in Lemma 1, the results
in Corollary 1 and 2 related to θˆL also hold for one-sided 1− α confidence intervals.
4.4 Relationship to p-values
In this section, we describe the relationship between confidence intervals for the exceedance
probability and p-values. Similar to Section 4.3, throughout this section we drop the
subscript j, though we assume that θ = θj and σ
2 = Σjj where θ = (θ1, . . . , θd)
T and Σ ∈
Rd×d, 1 ≤ j ≤ d. We note that De Martini (2012) provides a complementary comparison
with a focus on hypothesis testing.
4.4.1 Two-sided hypothesis test
For observed data D, null hypothesis H0 : θ = c, and alternative H1 : θ 6= c, the p-value is
given by pc(D) = 2[1− Fn−d,0(
√
n|θˆ − c|/σˆ)]. We treat pc(D) as a function of the cutoff c
for fixed data D.
Figure 2 shows the p-value pc(D) (solid line) for the same data used in Figure 1. In
this example, D = (y1, . . . , yn)
T where yi
i.i.d∼ N(θ, σ2), i = 1, . . . , n for n = 100, and we
estimate θˆ = y¯, σˆ2 = (n− 1)−1∑ni=1(yi − y¯)2, and [θˆL, θˆU ] = θˆ ± tn−1,1−α/2σˆ. The quantity
1− pc(D) is also called the confidence curve (see Schweder and Hjort, 2016).
The pointwise 95% confidence intervals for Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep ≤ c) are also shown in Figure 2
(gray bands) for m = n. We show Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep ≤ c) in Figure 2 instead of Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep > c) to
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facilitate comparison with the p-value.
Figure 2: Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep ≤ c) compared to two-sided p-values for the sample mean with n =
m = 100. The gray area shows the two-sided 95% pointwise confidence intervals (the
pointwise confidence interval for a cutoff c is given by the vertical slice through the plot
that intersects the x-axis at c). The solid line shows the two-sided p-value pc(D) for fixed
data D and null hypotheses H0 : θ = c, where c is given on the x-axis.
By definition, {θˆL, θˆU} = {c : pc(D) = α}. In other words, the 1 − α two-sided
confidence interval for θ can be found by drawing a horizontal line at α on the y-axis
in Figure 2 and finding the leftmost and rightmost cutoffs c at which the horizontal line
intersects the solid curve. This is shown in Figure 2 for α = 0.05.
From Corollary 1, we have that for the two-sided 1 − α confidence interval around
Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep > c), the lower bound is 0.5 at c = θˆL and the upper bound is 0.5 at c = θˆU .
Equivalently, for the 1 − α confidence interval around Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep ≤ c), the upper bound
is 0.5 at c = θˆL and the lower bound is 0.5 at c = θˆU . In other words, at the edges of
the two-sided 1 − α confidence interval for θ, the two-sided p-value is always equal to α,
and with 1− α confidence the exceedance probability could be as low or high as 0.5. This
is demonstrated in Figure 2 for α = 0.05 by the intersections between the vertical and
horizontal dashed lines.
The preceding discussion shows that when a p-value of α is obtained for the null hy-
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pothesis H0 : θ = c versus alternative H1 : θ 6= c, then with 1 − α confidence there could
be up to a 50% probability of obtaining a future point estimate on the other side of c.
4.4.2 One-sided hypothesis test
For one-sided hypothesis tests, the p-value from a t-test is equivalent to the exceedance
probability given by (2) for large n. For example, suppose we wanted to test the null
hypothesis H0 : θ ≤ c versus the alternative H1 : θ > c. The p-value is given by pc(D) =
Fn−d,0(
√
n(c − θˆ)/σˆ). For m = n, we have that pc(D) → Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep ≤ c) as n → ∞.
Notably, this makes it possible to use confidence intervals for the exceedance probability
to obtain asymptotic pointwise confidence intervals for one-sided p-values.
For the null and alternative hypotheses above, the lower one-sided confidence interval
is [θˆL,∞) where θˆL = θˆ − tn−d,1−ασˆ/
√
n. As noted in Section 4.3, by replacing tn−d,1−α/2
with tn−d,1−α in Lemma 1, Corollary 1 shows that the upper bound of a one-sided 1 − α
confidence interval for Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep ≤ θˆL) is equal to 0.5. Because pc(D) ≈ Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆrep ≤ c)
for large n, the upper one-sided 1 − α confidence interval for pθˆL(D) is always bounded
above by 0.5 for large n. In other words, if the one-sided p-value is equal to α, the 1 − α
confidence interval for the p-value is always [0, 0.5]. This is shown in Figure 3 for α = 0.05
using the same data as in Section 4.4.1, and demonstrates the large amount of variability
inherent to p-values near the 0.05 cutoff.
The results shown in Figure 3 may seem at odds with known behaviors of p-values,
such as being uniformly distributed under the null hypothesis and having an approximate
lognormal distribution under alternative hypotheses if certain conditions apply, including
asymptotic normality of the test statistic (Lambert and Hall, 1982; Boos and Stefanski,
2011). However, the viewpoint in Figure 3 does not conflict with these well known results
and in fact complements them, as described below.
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Figure 3: Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep ≤ c) and one-sided p-values for the sample mean with n = m =
100. The gray area shows the one-sided 95% pointwise confidence intervals (the pointwise
confidence interval for a cutoff c is given by the vertical slice through the plot that intersects
the x-axis at c). The solid curve shows the one-sided p-value pc(D) for fixed data D and
null hypotheses H0 : θ ≤ c versus the alternative H1 : θ > c, where c is given on the x-axis.
Typically, the distribution of p-values is obtained upon repeated sampling of data D
under a fixed null hypothesis (e.g. H0 : θ = 0). In contrast, here we fix the data D and
obtain confidence intervals for the p-value under different null hypotheses (H0 : θ = c for a
series of c).
Suppose in truth θ = θˆL and we wanted to test the null H0 : θ ≤ θˆL versus the
alternative H1 : θ > θˆL. Upon sampling new data, the black solid curve in Figure 3 would
shift left or right and intersect the vertical dashed line at a different y-axis value, giving a
new p-value. For example, if the shifted curve intersected the vertical dashed line at 0.2
on the y-axis, the p-value for that sample wold be 0.2. Over many such samples of data,
we would obtain a uniform distribution of p-values between 0 and 1.
One can imagine that if in truth θ = 1 instead of θˆL (where θˆL < 1 as shown in Figure
3) then upon repeated sampling of data the black curve would tend to fall farther to the
right then its current position and would intersect the vertical dashed line at much lower
y-axis values. This would lead to a heavily left-skewed distribution of p-values, as expected
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under the alternative hypothesis.
5 Examples
5.1 Simulated data
In this section, we demonstrate how confidence intervals for the exceedance probability can
be used in practice for the sample mean and how they compare to p-values, Bayes factors,
and standard confidence intervals. For this example, we generated data D = (y1, . . . , yn)
T
where yi
i.i.d.∼ N(θ, σ2), i = 1, . . . , n, for θ = 0 and σ2 = 1. We then set θˆ = y¯ and
σˆ2 = (n− 1)−1∑ni=1(yi − y¯)2.
Figure 4 shows the simulated data for n = 100 observations (y¯ = 0.25, sd = 1.1) and
Figure 5 shows the exceedance probabilities with pointwise 95% confidence intervals. In
Figure 5, the x-axis shows the cutoff value c, the y-axis shows the exceedance probability,
the solid black S-shaped curve shows the point estimate of the exceedance probability,
and the gray area shows the 95% pointwise confidence intervals. The pointwise confidence
interval for a cutoff c is given by the vertical slice through the plot that intersects the
x-axis at c. For example, at c = 0 the point estimate is Prθˆj ,σˆj(θˆ
rep
j > 0) ≈ 1.0 and the 95%
confidence interval is [0.58, 1].
Figure 4: Histogram of generated data and true mean (dashed line), n = 100.
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Figure 5: Exceedance probability for m = n = 100 with pointwise 95% confidence intervals.
The pointwise confidence interval for a cutoff c is given by the vertical slice through the
plot that intersects the x-axis at c.
Suppose we wanted to test the null hypothesis H0 : θ ≤ 0 versus the alternative H1 :
θ > 0. A one-sided t-test gives a p-value of 0.015 and the 1-sided 95% confidence interval
is [0.06,∞), so we would incorrectly reject H0 under the standard 0.05 significance level.
We also computed a Bayes factor for the one-sided null hypothesis using the BayesFactor
package (Morey and Rouder, 2015) with a Cauchy prior on the standardized effect size and
a non-informative Jeffreys prior on the variance, also called a JZS prior (Rouder et al.,
2009; Morey and Rouder, 2011). As Rouder et al. (2009) note, the “JZS prior is designed
to minimize assumptions about the range of effect size, and in this sense it is an objective
prior.” Using the JZS prior, we obtained a Bayes factor in favor of H0 of B01 = 0.016.
According to Kass and Raftery (1995), this is strong evidence against the null hypothesis
(1/B01 = 60.7).
However, from Figure 5 we see that with 95% certainty, Prθˆ,σˆ(θˆ
rep > 0) could be as low
as 58% for a replication study with m = 100 observations. In this example, the p-value
and Bayes factor provide confidence that θ > 0, but there is a reasonable chance that a
future point estimate of θ will be less than 0. In this situation, considering the exceedance
probability together with its confidence interval could help researchers to avoid making
claims that may be refuted by future experiments.
We note that whereas the exceedance probability is itself directional (being the prob-
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ability of observing an estimate larger than a cutoff), the confidence intervals depicted by
the gray bands in Figure 5 are two-sided and not directional. This is a key distinction to
keep in mind when interpreting Figure 5.
It is most natural to compare the exceedance probability against one-sided confidence
intervals, p-values, and Bayes factors, because they are all directional. However, for com-
pleteness we can also compare with two-sided metrics. In this example, the two-sided 95%
confidence interval for θ is [0.024, 0.47] and the two-sided p-value is 0.03. This shows that
under a 0.05 significance level we would also reject the point null hypothesis H0 : θ = 0
in favor of the alternative H1 : θ 6= 0. In contrast, a two-sided Bayes factor computed
with the BayesFactor package (Morey and Rouder, 2015) and JZS prior gives a result of
B01 = 0.91, which provides no evidence for either the null or alternative hypothesis.
Of the p-values, standard confidence intervals, and Bayes factors above, all but the
Bayes factor for the two-sided null result in an incorrect rejection of the null. Confidence
intervals for the exceedance probability add context by showing that in a replication study
there is a reasonable chance of obtaining a point estimate that is of the opposite sign
based on sampling variability alone. This result could be distilled into the message, “while
the confidence interval only contains positive values, there is a decent chance that in a
replication study the point estimate would be negative.” In this way, confidence intervals
for the exceedance probability can complement other inferential procedures.
The data in this example are unusual in that the sample mean is 2.27 standard de-
viations above the true population mean of 0. However, that is also the point. Due to
publication bias and related issues, there are many more p-values just under 0.05 reported
in psychological studies than would be expected by chance alone (Ku¨hberger et al., 2014).
In other words, many of the results reported in scientific journals are likely based on un-
usual data sets, in the same way that this example is unusual. We think this example helps
to shed light on this issue, and that considering confidence intervals for the exceedance
probability together with other metrics might help to mitigate this problem.
We also note that these different metrics (p-values, standard confidence intervals, Bayes
factors, and confidence intervals for the exceedance probability) answer different questions.
While they are related, it is not necessarily unexpected that they give different conclu-
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sions. By considering these metrics together, researchers can draw more informed scientific
conclusions.
5.2 Data from the Open Science Collaboration
We analyzed a dataset that was collected as part of the Open Science Collaboration effort
to replicate 100 psychological studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). In particular,
we re-analyzed data from the replication study of Meixner and Bruening (2015) (available
at https://osf.io/atgp5), which aimed to replicate the results of Berry et al. (2008).
We did not have access to data from the original study of Berry et al. (2008), so we only
analyzed data from the replication study of Meixner and Bruening (2015).
In the replication study of Meixner and Bruening (2015), each of 32 female volunteers
was primed with an initial list of 70 words (the first and last ten of which were not used in
later trials). The words were shown sequentially in a specific manner described by Meixner
and Bruening (2015). Each volunteer was then shown a second list of 100 words, one word
after the other, and asked to identify as quickly as possible whether the word in the new
list was also in the initial list (50 were in the initial list and 50 were not). To replicate the
main findings of Berry et al. (2008), Meixner and Bruening (2015) hypothesized that the
mean response time (RT) of misses (incorrectly saying a word was not in the initial list)
would be quicker than the mean RT of correct rejections (correctly saying a word was not
in the initial list).
Data from the replication study, accessible via the R script at https://osf.io/9ivaj,
has one row per study volunteer. The relevant columns are meanRT_miss and meanRT_cr,
the mean RT for misses and correct rejections, respectively, in milliseconds (ms). Meixner
and Bruening (2015) proceed by conducting a paired t-test, or equivalently, a t-test for
whether d¯i = y¯i1 − y¯i2 have mean zero, where y¯i1 and y¯i2 are the mean RT for volunteer i
for correct rejections and misses, respectively, and each d¯i is treated as a single observation.
Analyzing the data in this way may under-represent the number of observations, though this
is not likely to alter the conclusions of Meixner and Bruening (2015) regarding statistical
significance.
Data from Meixner and Bruening (2015) are shown in Figure 6. A t-test for the two-
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sided null hypothesis H0 : θ = 0 versus the alternative H1 : θ 6= 0 where θ is the population
difference in RTs gives a p-value of 0.023 (95% confidence interval of [8.65, 107]), which
confirms the finding of Berry et al. (2008). We also computed a Wilcoxon signed rank test
of the null of symmetry about 0 and obtained the nearly identical p-value of 0.022, and
used the BayesFactor package (Morey and Rouder, 2015) with the JZS prior to compute
a two-sided Bayes factor in favor of the null of B01 = 0.45, which provides no evidence for
either the null or alternative.
Figure 6: Histogram of within-volunteer difference in RT (ms)
Figure 7 shows the exceedance probability for m = n = 32 volunteers, along with two-
sided 95% pointwise confidence intervals. As shown in Figure 7, with 95% confidence the
probability of obtaining a point estimate greater than zero in a future replication study
could be as low as 63%. In other words, with 95% confidence there could be as high as
a 37% chance of a sign change in a future replication based on sampling variability alone.
This conclusion is based only on sampling variability, and does not account for other aspects
of the future replication study that may differ from the current one.
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Figure 7: Exceedance probability for m = n = 32 volunteers with pointwise 95% confidence
intervals. The pointwise confidence interval for a cutoff c is given by the vertical slice
through the plot that intersects the x-axis at c.
We also calculated one-sided confidence intervals, p-values, and Bayes factors for the
null hypothesis H0 : θ ≤ 0 versus the alternative H1 : θ > 0. This gave a p-value of 0.011, a
95% confidence interval of [17.0,∞) and a Bayes factor in favor of the null of B01 = 0.014.
In all cases we would reject the null hypothesis.
Of the p-values, confidence intervals, and Bayes factors above, all but the Bayes factor
for the two-sided null hypothesis reject the null. However, as shown above, there is a
reasonable chance that based on sampling variability alone, a future replication study
would result in an estimate that is of the opposite sign.
6 Conclusions
In many situations, confidence intervals for the exceedance probability provide a simple,
interpretable, and scientifically relevant metric that is geared towards replication. In par-
ticular, the exceedance probability is the same as power for a certain choice of one-sided
hypothesis and cutoff, which is a familiar concept. Furthermore, when cutoffs are chosen
to be substantively meaningful, confidence intervals for the exceedance probability provide
likely probabilities of observing a substantively meaningful result in an exact replication
study. This may help researchers to understand the stability of their result and comple-
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ments standard confidence intervals and p-values.
The exceedance probability can only be interpreted as the reproducibility probability if
the replication study is exactly the same as the initial study and enrolls participants from
the exact same population. This may not hold in practice for a field such as psychology,
in which there can be large between-study heterogeneity, which could cause the confidence
intervals given by (3) to underestimate the amount of uncertainty in a future replication.
However, as demonstrated in this article, confidence intervals for the exceedance probability
can still provide an important perspective on estimation uncertainty that is not conveyed
by standard confidence intervals and p-values.
We are not advocating that confidence intervals for the exceedance probability replace
other metrics such as p-values and standard confidence intervals. Rather, we think that
when used in conjunction with other methods, confidence intervals for the exceedance
probability can provide a more complete understanding of estimation uncertainty.
We also note that confidence intervals for the exceedance probability can be used for
hypothesis testing, just as standard confidence intervals can be used for the same purpose
(De Martini, 2008, 2012, 2013). However, we think that in many applications it is more
informative, relevant, and scientifically sound to use confidence intervals to describe the
exceedance probabilities most compatible with the data as opposed to as a tool for making
a yes/no decision. As Amrhein et al. (2019a) note, “values just outside the interval do
not differ substantively from those just inside the interval” and “not all values inside are
equally compatible with the data, given the assumptions.” The same caution is warranted
here.
On a pedagogical note, the asymptotic behavior of confidence intervals for the ex-
ceedance probability as the size of an exact replication study becomes large might be useful
for teaching purposes. In particular, this might help to reinforce the concept of confidence
intervals in application-oriented introductory settings by emphasizing the uncertainty in a
random but observable parameter estimate, as opposed to the uncertainty about a fixed
but unobservable parameter value. However, in applications we recommend selecting m
similar in size to n to accurately portray uncertainty.
In future work, it would be helpful to evaluate the performance of different confidence
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interval procedures for asymptotically normal estimators, such as MLEs. For example,
using normal instead of t-distribution pivotal quantities, or bootstrap methods. We think
it would also be helpful to investigate procedures for forming simultaneous confidence
intervals for multi-parameter exceedance probabilities, and to compare the intervals given
by (3) against Bayesian predictive methods. In the context of clinical trials, Shao and
Chow (2002) found that frequentist confidence intervals for the exceedance probability
were more conservative than Bayesian predictive methods, and it could be useful to study
these trade-offs in the setting of psychological research as well.
7 Supplementary material
The R package exceedProb implements confidence intervals for the exceedance probability
and is available on the CRAN. All code for reproducing examples and simulations in this
paper is available at https://github.com/bdsegal/code-for-exceedance-paper.
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Appendix A Derivation of confidence intervals
This appendix follows Meeker et al. (2017, Section E.3.4) with the addition that we in-
troduce the scaling factor
√
m/n to allow for m 6= n and show that the result holds for
any linear combination of normal random variables and d > 1 mean parameters. Sup-
pose θˆ, θˆrep ∈ Rd are linear combinations of normal random variables as in Section 4. In
particular, θˆ = Ay for fixed A ∈ Rd×n and y ∼ N(µ, ν2V ) where V is a known nonsin-
gular and positive definite n × n matrix and E[θˆ] = θ, with an equivalent assumption for
θˆrep. As described in Section 4.1, the marginal exceedance probability for θˆrepj , 1 ≤ j ≤ d,
is Prθj ,σj(θˆ
rep
j > c) = 1 − Φ (
√
m(c− θj)/σj) where Φ is the standard normal CDF and
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σ2j = nν
2(AV AT)jj. Let
Z =
√
n(θj − θˆj)
σj
, δ(c) =
√
n(c− θj)
σj
, and S =
(n− d)σˆ2j
σ2j
where σˆ2j = nνˆ
2(AV AT)jj, νˆ
2 = (n− d)−1‖yˆ − y‖22, and yˆ are the fitted values. Also let
Q =
√
n(c− θˆj)
σˆj
=
Z + δ(c)√
S/(n− d) .
We note that
σˆ2j
σ2j
=
nνˆ2(AV AT)jj
nν2(AV AT)jj
=
νˆ2
ν2
.
Therefore,
S =
(n− d)σˆ2j
σ2j
=
(n− d)νˆ2
ν2
∼ χ2n−d
where χ2n−d is the chi-squared distribution with n − d degrees of freedom. We also have
Z ∼ N(0, 1) and Z ⊥ S. It follows that Q ∼ Fn−d,δ(c).
We note that Fn−d,δ(c) is strictly monotone decreasing in δ(c), and serves as a pivotal
quantity (Shao, 2003, Theorem 7.1). Consequently, a two-sided 1 − α confidence interval
for δ(c) is given by [δL(c), δU(c)] where Fn−d,δL(c)(q) = 1− α/2 and Fn−d,δU (c)(q) = α/2 for
observed value q =
√
n(c−θˆj)/σˆj. We also note that Prθj ,σj(θˆrepj > c) = 1−Φ(
√
m/nδ(c)) is
strictly monotone decreasing in δ(c) for fixed m and n. Consequently, a two-sided 1−α con-
fidence interval for Prθj ,σj(θˆ
rep
j > c) = 1−Φ(
√
m/nδ(c)) is given by [1−Φ(√m/nδU(c)), 1−
Φ(
√
m/nδL(c))]. This is the result shown in (3) of Section 4.1.
Appendix B Coverage probability simulations
In this appendix, we investigated the coverage probability of intervals given by (3) for the
sample mean and linear regression. For k = 1, . . . , K, we generated data Dk and estimated
θˆk and Σˆk with data Dk. We then estimated the coverage probability at cutoff c as
Pˆ (c) = K−1
∑K
k=1 1
[
Prθj ,σj(θˆ
rep
j > c) ∈ Ikc
]
for intervals Ikc formed with (3). Throughout,
we set α = 0.05 for a nominal coverage probability of 0.95.
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B.1 Sample mean
We generated data in the same manner as in Section 5. In particular, for each of k =
1, . . . , K, we generated data Dk = (yk1 , . . . , y
k
n)
T where yki
i.i.d.∼ N(θ, σ2), i = 1, . . . , n, for
θ = 0 and σ2 = 1. Consequently, the true exceedance probability is Prθ,σ(θˆ
rep > c) =
1− Φ(√mc).
Results from K = 10, 000 simulated datasets with n = 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 observations
and a replication sample size of m = n are shown in Table 1. As seen in Table 1, the
confidence intervals achieve their nominal coverage probability.
Table 1: Empirical coverage probability for 1−Φ(√mc) for different samples sizes, m = n,
and cutoffs c for the sample mean. K = 10, 000 datasets generated for each sample size n.
n
c 20 40 60 80 100
-0.5 0.953 0.945 0.951 0.946 0.951
-0.4 0.953 0.946 0.950 0.946 0.950
-0.3 0.953 0.946 0.950 0.946 0.951
-0.2 0.953 0.947 0.949 0.946 0.951
-0.1 0.952 0.948 0.949 0.945 0.951
0.0 0.952 0.948 0.949 0.946 0.951
0.1 0.952 0.948 0.948 0.945 0.951
0.2 0.951 0.946 0.949 0.947 0.952
0.3 0.951 0.947 0.949 0.946 0.951
0.4 0.951 0.947 0.949 0.947 0.951
0.5 0.950 0.947 0.950 0.947 0.951
B.2 Linear regression
We set the design matrix to X = [1,x] for n × 1 vectors 1 = (1, . . . , 1)T and x =
(x1, . . . , xn)
T where x was fixed for all simulations of the same sample size n (xi were ini-
tially generated as i.i.d. uniform(0, 10) random variables). We set the regression coefficients
to θ = (θ1, θ2)
T = (1, 2)T. For k = 1, . . . , K, we generated responses as yk ∼ N(Xθ, ν2In)
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for variance ν2 = 25. We then fit a linear model to obtain θˆk = (XTX)−1XTyk and
estimated the variance as Σˆk = nνˆ2,k(XTX)−1 where νˆ2,k = (n − 2)−1‖yk − yˆk‖22 and
yˆk = Xθˆk.
In truth, we have θˆk2 ∼ N(θ2, σ22/n) where σ22 = nν2(XTX)−12,2. Consequently, the true
exceedance probability is Prθ2,σ2(θˆ
rep
2 > c) = 1− Φ(
√
m(c− 2)/
√
n25(XTX)−12,2).
Results from K = 10, 000 simulated datasets with n = 20, 40, 60, 80, 100 observations
and a replication sample size of m = n are shown in Table 2. As seen in Table 2, the
confidence intervals achieve their nominal coverage probability.
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Table 2: Empirical coverage probability for 1−Φ(√m(c− 2)/
√
25n(XTX)−12,2 for different
samples sizes n = m and cutoffs c for the slope of a simple linear regression. K = 10, 000
datasets simulated for each sample size n.
n
Cutoff 20 40 60 80 100
1.0 0.954 0.950 0.951 0.947 0.949
1.1 0.954 0.950 0.951 0.947 0.949
1.2 0.953 0.950 0.951 0.947 0.949
1.3 0.952 0.950 0.951 0.947 0.949
1.4 0.953 0.949 0.950 0.947 0.950
1.5 0.952 0.950 0.950 0.947 0.951
1.6 0.952 0.950 0.950 0.947 0.951
1.7 0.953 0.949 0.950 0.948 0.950
1.8 0.952 0.949 0.950 0.949 0.949
1.9 0.953 0.950 0.951 0.949 0.950
2.0 0.952 0.950 0.951 0.948 0.950
2.1 0.953 0.950 0.951 0.948 0.950
2.2 0.952 0.951 0.951 0.948 0.949
2.3 0.952 0.951 0.951 0.948 0.949
2.4 0.952 0.952 0.951 0.948 0.949
2.5 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.948 0.949
2.6 0.950 0.951 0.952 0.949 0.949
2.7 0.950 0.950 0.953 0.949 0.950
2.8 0.950 0.950 0.953 0.949 0.950
2.9 0.952 0.951 0.953 0.950 0.949
3.0 0.950 0.951 0.952 0.949 0.949
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